Rhine Crossing
THE RHINE CROSSING (OPERATION ‘VARSITY’)
Ingram Murray & Stanley C. Jenkins
By March 1945, the Germans had all but lost the war in North West Europe. They had failed to split the Allies in the Ardennes and had been forced back over the Rhine with heavy losses. Allied bombing had disrupted communications and production of weapons, ammunition and oil. However, they were apparently determined to fight to the bitter end, and to make a stand on their last great natural barriers - the Rhine in the west and the Oder in the east. In the east, the Soviet Red Army had already established bridgeheads over the Oder, and was threatening Berlin from the south. In the west the Allies had closed up to the River Rhine, with the 21st Army Group, consisting of the Canadian First Army, the British Second Army and the United States Ninth Army facimg the Germans in the northern sector; the United States First, Third. and Seventh Armies in the centre; and the French First Army in the south; with altogether some 4 million men.
The great industrial area of the Ruhr, which was heavily garrisoned by the remaining elite of the German forces, lay to the east of the Rhine between the British and United States sectors of the front. Despite prolonged and heavy bombing, the war industries of the Ruhr were still working, and they were of paramount importance to the continued existence of the German field forces. The Allied strategy was to cross the Rhine to the north and south of the Ruhr, encircle and annihilate the enemy garrisons, capture the Ruhr and continue to advance to the east, mopping-up the remaining German forces as quickly as possible.
While the British sat down to formulate their plan, the Americans kept going and succeeded in seizing two bridgeheads over the Rhine, the most spectacular being the capture of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen by the United States 9th Armored Division on 7th March 1945.
Operation ‘Plunder’
The outline plan for what was to be Operation ‘Plunder’, as laid down by General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander, was for the British to cross the Rhine between Xanten and Rees, establish a bridgehead at Wesel and break out towards the north of the Ruhr, while the Americans were to break out from their bridgehead at Remagen to the south of the Ruhr. The two thrusts were then to link up east of the Ruhr to encircle the garrison, and to continue pressing eastwards to cover as much of Germany as possible before meeting the Red Army.
Orders issued by Field Marshall Montgomery on 9th March 1945 called for British XII Corps, part of the Second Army, to make an assault crossing of the River Rhine at Wesel on the night of 23rd-24th March and to establish a bridgehead on the east bank, while on 24th March XVIII Airborne Corps was to land on the enemy gun area behind the main enemy defence line in order to disrupt the German defence, prevent reinforcements reaching the area, and enlarge the bridgehead so that an armoured break-out could be mounted without delay.
The sequence of events on XII Corps front was to be as follows:
(a) 21st March
Allied air attacks to neutralize enemy airfields and anti-aircraft defences.
(b) 23rd March
17.30 hrs - The RAF to bomb Wesel.
18.00 hrs - Massed artillery to begin softening-up the enemy defences.
22.00 hrs - No.1 Commando Brigade to cross the Rhine and surround Wesel.
22.30-22.45 hrs - The RAF to bomb Wesel on request.
(c ) 24th March
02.00 hrs - XII Corps to make an assault crossing of the Rhine at Wesel under an artillery barrage with two divisions to the north and two divisions to the south of the town, while the Commando Brigade occupied Wesel itself.
10.00 hrs -XVIII Airborne Corps to land by parachute and glider about five miles ahead of XII Corps in the area of Hamminkeln and Köpenhof.
13.00 hrs - Airborne troops to be resupplied by air.
(d) 25th March
Ground troops to link-up with airborne troops and continue to press eastwards.
The German First Parachute Army
The German defenders opposite XII Corps and in the XVIII Airborne Corps landing area were the First Parachute Army under General Alfred Schlemm (1894-1986). Although made up of seven divisions of parachute troops, panzer grenadiers and infantry, they were seriously under strength and short of materiel. It was estimated by Allied Intelligence that perhaps 50,000 men and 100-150 armoured fighting vehicles were within a 20-mile radius of the intended crossing area.
While the quality of these troops was mixed, it was expected that the parachute troops and panzer grenadiers would fight hard to defend their homeland, and General Ridgeway, commanding XVII Airborne Corps, was not going to repeat the mistakes of Arnhem by underestimating the German reaction to an airborne landing. While the fighter aircraft of the Luftwaffe were no longer a factor, the local flak defences were reinforced during March to more than 700 light AA guns and 114 heavy AA guns, indicating that the Germans were anticipating an airborne landing. The flak defences were taken very seriously, and a special flak committee was set up by the Allies to identify the threat and guide the 2nd Tactical Air Force in its task of flak suppression.
The Airborne Plan - Operation ‘Varsity’
The airborne task for XVIII Airborne Corps as expressed in the Operation Order was:
‘To disrupt the hostile defence of the Rhine in the Wesel sector by the seizure of key terrain by airborne attack, in order to deepen rapidly the bridgehead to be seized in an assault crossing of the Rhine by British ground forces and facilitate the further offensive operations of the Second Army’.
The XVIII Airborne Corps, which was commanded by Major-General Matthew B.Ridgway, US Army, consisted of the United States 17th Airborne Division and the British 6th Airborne Division. Ridgeway had been involved with American Airborne Forces since the invasion of Sicily, and had commanded the 82nd US Airborne Division. He had jumped on Normandy and into Holland in Operation ‘Market Garden’, and had established himself as an experienced, decisive and hard-driving commander. He also had decided views about some of the British Airborne commanders and their methods.
The US 17th Airborne Division was a new formation, which had not so far undertaken an operational drop, its battle experience being confined to the fighting in the Ardennes. It was commanded by Major General William M.‘Bud’ Miley (1897-1997), and it comprised two parachute infantry regiments together with a glider infantry regiment and supporting arms.
The 6th Airborne Division was commanded by Major-General Eric Bols (1904-1985), who had taken over from General Gale, the commander of the division on D-Day, 6th June. The division comprised the James Hill’s 3rd Parachute Brigade, Nigel Poett’s 5th Parachute Brigade and the 6th Air-Landing Brigade. These were supported by an Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment, the 53rd Air-landing Light Regiment, (The Worcestershire Yeomanry), Royal Artillery, together with engineers and other airborne divisional troops. Each of the brigades in the 6th Airborne Division consisted of three battalions, the regiments in the 6th Air-Landing Brigade being the 1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles, the 52nd Light Infantry and the 12th Battalion Devonshire Regiment. The brigade was commanded by Brigadier Robert Hugh Bellamy.
The ground on which the airborne landings were planned to take place was for the most part flat agricultural land divided by ditches and wire fences, with farmhouses and scattered copses. The one relatively commanding feature was the thickly-wooded Diersfordterwald, with the Schnappenberg standing about 200 feet above mean sea level. All the roads in the area converged on the village of Hamminkeln, a village about five miles to the east of the Rhine. Just to the west of Hamminkeln is the River Issel - a canalised stream with high banks running more or less parallel to the Rhine. There was also an Autobahn under construction to the east of the Issel crossing which crossed the country in a more or less north-to-south direction.
The bitter lessons of Arnhem learned by the 1st Airborne Division meant that this time the whole of XVIII Airborne Corps - 14,000 men and their equipment - was to be flown in one lift, landed within the space of an hour, in daylight, directly onto their objectives. The US 17th Division was to be lifted from fifteen airfields in France by IX Troop Carrier Command in 913 aircraft and 906 Hadrian gliders. The 6th Airborne Division were to fly from eight airfields in East Anglia, the parachutists aboard Dakotas, while the air-landing troops, support weapons and supplies would be carried in 392 Horsa and 48 Hamilcar gliders. Six jeeps and anti-tank guns were to be dropped by parachute from Halifax bombers – the first time this technique was to be used on operations.
When the RAF protested that they did not have sufficient glider tugs to tow the Horsa and Hamilcar gliders required by the 6th Airborne Division, AOCs 38 and 46 Groups were ordered by Supreme HQ to provide more aircraft. By increasing the establishment of the tug squadrons and hauling in bombers from operational training units, and by retaining tour-expired crews to fly them, the Air Marshals rectified the problem. Hasty training of pilots in glider-towing followed.
Altogether, the aircraft provided to carry the US 17th and the British 6th Airborne Divisions comprised 1,696 transport planes - mainly C-47 Dakotas but with some C-46 Curtiss Commandos, and 1,348 gliders, protected by approximately 1,000 escorting fighters – a total of no less that 4,000 aircraft. In addition, 120 Liberators were to overfly the area and drop supplies shortly after the landings.
The Shortage of Glider Pilots
The casualties sustained by the Glider Pilot Regiment at Arnhem had reduced the strength below the number required to fly in the gliders carrying the 6th Air-Landing Brigade and the support weapons of the Parachute Brigades. Brigadier George Chatterton, Commander Glider Pilots, who had once been a flight lieutenant in the RAF, appealed to a former comrade who now occupied the desk of the Director of Training at the Air Ministry to provide trained RAF pilots from the very large pool awaiting posting. As a result, Air Chief Marshal Sir Peter Drummond allocated 1,500 trained bomber pilots from the RAF pool to fly his gliders. They were speedily put through a conversion course to fly and land Horsas, and spent a three-week weapons and tactics course at a battle school to bring them up to a standard approximating to the ‘Total Soldiers’ of the Glider Pilot Regiment. Chatterton matched them in terms of rank with officers and NCOs of the Glider Pilot Regiment and also allocated them so that as far as possible, each glider would be flown by an RAF pilot and a Glider Pilot Regiment pilot. In the event they were to do well, even if they were not all volunteers.
Chatterton also persuaded Major-General Bols to adopt his idea of tactical landings, whereby, in addition to specific coup de main tasks, the gliders carrying each company group were to be directed to land next to their objective - be it a farmhouse or copse. The briefing was therefore very detailed, and the glider pilots were all given a particular landmark to aim for when coming in to land, and provided with air photos of their objective.
Preparations
In December 1944, the 6th Airborne Division, including the Air-Landing Brigade, had been rushed to Belgium to help stem the German attack in the Ardennes and, after the failure of the offensive, had spent the winter patrolling and skirmishing along the line of the River Meuse. The Regimental Chronicle tells us that in February 1945 the 52nd Light Infantry flew back to England with the rest of the division, and returned to its home base at Bulford Camp. Preparations to re-equip, reorganize and prepare for the next operation were begun immediately. No one knew when or what the next operation was to be, but it was obvious that it would be soon and in support of a crossing of the Rhine.
Early in March two full-scale divisional exercises were held in the Bury St Edmunds area. These were rehearsals for the forthcoming assault crossing of the River Rhine, though this was not divulged at the time. On their return to barracks, the Commanding Officer was handed a Warning Order that the 6th Airborne Division was to carry out an airborne operation in North-West Europe before the end of March. All troops were to move into concentration areas for the operation by 20th March. The Regiment was allotted a concentration area at Birch airfield, to the south-west of Colchester, and an advanced party under Major Edmunds left to reconnoitre the area immediately.
As a battalion in an Air-Landing Brigade, the 52nd Light Infantry was organized into four rifle companies, together with a Support Company and a Headquarters Company. The rifle companies were designated ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ Companies, while the Support Company and Headquarters Company were 'S' and ‘H’ companies respectively. There was also a general purpose Reinforcement Company, known ‘R’ Company.
Each of the rifle companies comprised three platoons with an officer, a sergeant and twenty-eight soldiers. Each rifle platoon had a PIAT (the short-range platoon anti-tank weapon), three light machine guns, four machine carbines, a wireless, and light metal handcart with bicycle-type wheels in which to carry some of its stores. Personal equipment consisted of a helmet, Denison smock, a small haversack, entrenching tool, water-bottle, webbing waist-belt and ammunition pouches.
Support Company had two Anti-tank Platoons, each equipped with four 6-pounder guns and six jeeps; three Mortar Platoons, each with four 3-inch mortars carried in five jeeps and trailers; one Medium Machine-gun Platoon equipped with four Vickers Medium Machine Guns, six jeeps and trailers; and a Company Headquarters of two jeeps and two trailers. The HQ Company included Regimental Headquarters, the Signals Platoon, Pioneer Platoon, Reconnaissance Platoon, Transport Platoon, and the Quartermaster’s Administrative Platoon. The Reconnaissance Platoon had four Vickers medium machine guns, together with jeeps, trailers and motorcycles. Of these, the Administrative Platoon and most of the Transport Platoon had a second jeep and trailer for each company.
A Horsa glider could carry a rifle platoon of 29 and its handcart, or a jeep and 6-pounder anti-tank gun with a crew of six, or a jeep and loaded trailer with a similar crew. Rifle Company Headquarters travelled in one glider with its jeep and a trailer. The Regiment was warned that only about seventy Horsas would be available to it, and that it would be required to operate on ‘hard scales’ and consequently only fighting troops and essential equipment could go into action by air. A great deal of detailed planning was then necessary in order to ensure that the best possible use was made of the available gliders. No luxuries could be carried, and every inch of space and pound of weight had to be used to the best effect.
Such motor transport, equipment and men required for the initial assault landing, or could not be carried in the available gliders, were formed into a ‘sea tail’, which would cross to the Continent by ship and, with Major Mason's ‘land tail’, would rejoin the Regiment in the battle zone as soon as contact with ground forces had been established. The sea and land tails were the equivalent of A and B Echelons.
Although they would not necessarily take part in the battle, much of the essential administrative work was done by ‘R’ Company. They took the barracks on charge, staffed and ran the concentration area, were continually interchanging men with the other companies to ensure that they were up to strength and had the best specialists, but most importantly, ‘R’ Company had to load and man a duplicate glider for each operational load in the Regiment. Thus, if a glider containing a rifle platoon, a 3-inch mortar detachment, signals or anti-tank gun detachment came to grief on take-off, a fully prepared and briefed ‘R’ Company glider, with a similar crew and equipment, would be immediately available to take its place.
While these preparations were going ahead, several of those who had been wounded on previous operations, including Captain Fox and Lieutenants Leadson and Preston returned to the Regiment, all anxious to come at any cost.
Orders and Briefing
On 19th March 1945, the Sea Tail under Captain Busher the Transport Officer moved off for a south coast port and, on the following day, the 52nd Light Infantry moved by road to Birch Airfield, where the Regiment was sealed-in until take off:
‘At the Birch concentration area the Regiment was met by the camp staff of R Company, who had a hot meal ready. This camp, in which the Regiment was sealed until take off for the operation, was a bleak, wired-in, hutted dispersal camp on the edge of the airfield. Needless to say, there was the usual dearth of light bulbs, and the canteen was poor. However, as it turned out, the Regiment was to take off in five days' time, and these days were so busy with briefing and loading that the shortcomings of the camp were scarcely noticeable’.
In order to maintain secrecy, orders or briefing were not given until the Regiment was safely sealed-in. Only the Commanding Officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Darell-Brown DSO, and the Intelligence Officer, Captain Cross, knew anything of the plan. Briefing huts containing plaster models of the objective, all necessary maps and air photographs had already been prepared. The details of the Regiment’s task in the assault over the Rhine were first described to all ranks before the Commanding Officer gave his orders. Once Company Commanders and specialist officers had the plan given to them by the Commanding Officer, the glider pilots were brought in and introduced, and all the details of the fly-in and plan of attack were thoroughly discussed and settled. After this, Company Commanders made their own plans, which were then explained to their troops.
The Brigade Plan
The 6th Airborne Division was to land directly ahead of the assault river crossing. The task of the 6th Air-Landing Brigade was to capture and hold the road and rail crossings over the River Issel to the east of Hamminkeln and also the town of Hamminkeln itself, to form a bridgehead for the advancing ground troops to pass through, to destroy or capture all enemy forces in the area, and to prevent enemy reinforcements from moving into the area of Wesel.
It was known that the enemy had a small garrison at Hamminkeln and at Ringenburg who would probably guard the road bridges, and also that there were a number of light anti-aircraft guns in the landing zones. It was envisaged that the enemy would probably launch a counter-attack, and that columns of reinforcements might be moving through the area as the landing took place.
Each battalion and each company of the 6th Air-Landing Brigade was to land directly on its objective, the whole attack being planned in effect as a coup de main. The task of the Royal Ulster Rifles was to capture the Hamminkeln to Brunen road bridge over the River Issel, while the 12th Devons would seize the town of Hamminkeln itself. The 52nd Light Infantry, landing immediately to the north, would capture the Hamminkeln to Ringenburg road bridge over the Issel, the railway bridge about two hundred yards to the north of it, Hamminkeln railway station, and the road junction to the west. It would then hold the line of the River Issel from Hamminkeln railway station to the Ringenburg road bridge. Each battalion was allotted Artillery Observation Officers, a troop of engineers and a section of the Field Ambulance for the operation. Forward Air Support teams would fly in with the Division equipped with ground to air communications to call for close air support.
P Hour on 24th March 1945 was set at 10.00 hrs, six hours after the launch of the assault crossing of the Rhine. The parachute brigades were to land first in separate Dropping Zones, the Air Landing Brigade’s gliders to follow. Timings were tight - at 10.21 hrs eight Horsas with the coup de main party from the 52nd Light Infantry were to land on Landing Zone O next to the two bridges over the Issel, followed a minute later by seven Horsas with the Royal Ulster Rifles coup de main party on Landing Zone U next to the Brunen bridge further south. Only two minutes later fifty-eight Horsas carrying the rest of the 52nd Light Infantry were to come in on Landing Zone O with and a further fifty-nine on Landing Zone U, while the Royal Ulster Rifles, the Devons and Brigade HQ were to land on Landing Zone R to the south west of Hamminkeln in eighty-eight Horsas and six Hamilcars. Divisional HQ and the Gunners were to land on Landing Zone P at 10.35 hrs in one hundred and sixteen Horsas and twenty-eight Hamilcars. Further landings were to come in on Landing Zones A and B with support weapons for the two parachute brigades.
Take-off was to be at dawn, and the approach flight would be made in a column of loose pairs guarded along the route by a dozen fighter squadrons. The order of the fly-in was: the 52nd Light Infantry, followed by the Royal Ulster Rifles, the 12th Devons and Brigade Headquarters. The route was out over the North Sea, turning east over Brussels, passing over the Rhine and casting off over Hamminkeln for landing at P plus 21 minutes. Release height was to be 2,500 feet. The aircraft carrying the two parachute brigades would overtake the gliders, passing in a stream below, and dropping the parachutists on their objectives in the Diersfordterwald before the gliders landed in the Hamminkeln area.
The 52nd Light Infantry Plan
The companies ordered to capture the bridges were to land as close as possible to them. Having landed the task allotted to each company by the CO was as follows:
James Molloy’s ‘C’ Company, supported by two 6-pounder anti-tank guns and a section of medium machine guns, was to seize and hold the railway bridge and a group of farm buildings to the west of it.
Gilbert Rahr’s ‘B’ Company, supported by two anti-tank guns and a detachment of sappers, was to seize and hold the road bridge over the river. This bridge was to be taken intact if possible and prepared for demolition. It was not essential for the bridge to be held intact, but it was only to be blown on orders from the Brigade Commander.
Harry Styles ‘A’ Company, with two anti-tank guns and a section of medium machine guns, was to seize and hold the area of the road junction north of Hamminkeln, to link up with ‘C’ Company across the north of the Regiment’s position, to link up with the 12th Devons in Hamminkeln, and to establish contact westwards with troops of 5th Parachute Brigade.
John Tillett’s ‘D’ Company, with two anti-tank guns, was to be in a defensive position in reserve in the area of the track westwards from the station to Hamminkeln. It was to be prepared to make immediate local counter-attacks, and to send out patrols. ‘D’ Company was also to establish a prisoner-of-war cage in its area.
The Reconnaissance Platoons were to defend Hamminkeln railway station, assisted by any available glider pilots, and link-up with the Royal Ulster Rifles on their right.
Regimental Headquarters and the aid post were to be established in the railway station buildings.
Direct fire support was available from the Worcestershire Yeomanry and the 3-inch mortars. In addition, supporting fire could be given by the Divisional Artillery already across the Rhine, and medium artillery west of the Rhine. Communications were available to call for air support.
The Final Hours
The Regimental Chronicle describes how, by the evening of 23rd March, the gliders were loaded and dispersed ready for the morrow. The majority of heavier loads of Support Company and Regimental Headquarters were to fly from Gosfield towed by RAF Dakotas of 512, 575 and 271 Squadrons, while the rifle companies would fly from Birch behind Dakotas of 233, 437 and 48 Squadrons. All planning and briefing had been completed, and morale was high. The weather was good, and it looked like being a successful operation. There was a spirit of excitement about, and at dusk lively singing was to be heard throughout the camp. Enforced rest started at 21.00 hrs but, inevitably, it took a long time to get to sleep.
On 24th March the camp at Birch was roused at 02.30 hrs on a fine cold morning. Everyone had a good but hasty breakfast of fried eggs, bacon and beans, and moved off promptly at 04.00 hrs for the airfield in trucks. On arrival, platoons and detachments made their way to their gliders in the darkness. By 05.30 hrs everyone was aboard and strapped in. The tug aircraft started running-up their engines.
The leading tug turned onto the runway, the tow-rope was connected, a signal was given to take up the slack, another was flashed and with a roar the first combination swept down the runway and took off. It was quickly followed by the next, then the next until, within a few minutes, all were airborne and heading southwards in the dawn light to join the remainder of the brigade. It was 06.30 hrs. Safety belts were loosened and men settled down for the long flight. The combinations joined the huge stream of parachute aircraft, tugs and gliders of the 6th Airborne Division, which met up with the Americans over France and flew alongside them towards the Rhine:
‘The air was still and placid, and the flight uneventful. Even those most prone to air sickness could scarcely have felt a twinge that morning. We sat listening to the even roar of the slipstream. The sun rose in a clear blue sky, and we were over the sea in long, loose columns of pairs. Now and then the fighter escort was to be seen weaving high above, or scudding past below. As we passed over Brussels the Dakota aircraft of the parachute brigades slowly overtook us, flying in neat, light ‘Vic’ formation. Shortly afterwards one of our gliders broke its tow and circled down to land in a Belgian field’.
Lieutenant General Sir Napier Crookenden, who was commanding the British 9th Parachute Battalion, recalled the vast air armada as follows:
‘The two Airborne Divisions, the United States 17th and the British 6th, flew into battle together, and I shall never forget the sight and feel of the immense aerial armada. At Wavre in Belgium our long column of aircraft from the joined with the sky train of the 17th Division, coming up out of the south-west. Looking out of our starboard windows I could see their aircraft stretching back for miles, while from the open door on our port side the aircraft and the gliders of our own division were still coming up over the horizon from England - and ahead, the two streams of aircraft, each nine ships wide, were flying steadily on, side-by-side, towards Germany. Above and beside us wheeled the hundreds of fighters of our close escort, and soon I could see ahead of us the great curve of the River Rhine north of Wesel and our dropping zone beyond’.
The Landings
Thirty-five of the British gliders did not make it; broken tow-ropes, premature release by gliders caught in tugs’ slipstreams or engine trouble caused them to force-land in the UK or en route in Belgium. As the air armada approached the Rhine the leading aircrews saw an enormous pall of smoke and dust blowing over the area of the landings which had been thrown up by the bombing of Wesel, the smoke screen covering the assault river crossing and the artillery bombardment. Climbing to 3,500 feet, the tug captains attempted to fly over the dust cloud to the casting-off point over Hamminkeln church, but as they crossed the Rhine so the unsuppressed flak defences opened up on the stream of aircraft overhead.
Landing Zone O, which had appeared to be quite clear on the air photographs, with the broad yellow strip of the unfinished autobahn and the railway showing up well, was now obscured by smoke and dust, and the released gliders circled round through the murk looking for their pin-points on the Landing Zone, the light flak streaming up from the ground beneath. An account in the Chronicle vividly describes the landing:
‘At about 10.00 hrs we could see that we were approaching the Rhine, a broad, black ribbon below us. We saw the flashes of the guns, the heavy pall of smoke drifting away from Wesel, and the white wake of craft speeding across the river. Then we saw black puffs in the sky ahead, and realized that we were flying into a barrage of anti-aircraft fire. Several tugs ahead had already cast off, and were turning southwards with bright orange flames belching from their engines.
The battle was on. Seconds later all was pandemonium. We caught a glimpse of Hamminkeln church ahead, but our landing zone was obscured by a thick haze of smoke and dust drifting down from Wesel. Gliders were crashing down, gliders were on fire, the sky was full of airbursts and ribbons of tracer, but our pilots carried on. They were wonderful. We cast off and slowly circled round looking for the field in which we had to land, and were followed all the way down by flak. There were four enemy anti-aircraft gun-pits sited near the station, each having four multiple two or four-barrelled 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. Some of these were deliberately run down by landing gliders.
During the landing, which took only ten minutes to complete, we lost about half our total strength. The casualties were awful. Gliders circling in through the gloom of the smoke and flak piled into woods, into buildings, collided on the ground, crashed flaming from the sky, and some blew up into smithereens as they came in’.
The Commanding Officer’s glider came down on top of a 20 mm flak position, the glider pilot, Squadron Leader Reynolds ordering his second pilot, Pilot Officer Bailey to fire his Sten through the windscreen at the gunners as they crashed in. Bailey then took the gun crew prisoner as Lieutenant Colonel Darell-Brown and the HQ staff unloaded the glider. The Horsa carrying Captain Bousfield of 'A' Company landed almost on top of a German armoured half-track which he immediately commandeered. Major Tod Sweeney landed on the east side of the Issel and immediately came under fire from the German defenders of the nearby bridge. Lieutenant Hugh Clark’s Horsa landed close by, and he rushed the bridge with his platoon.
In the chaos of the landings, Regimental Quartermaster-Sergeant W. Alsopp, who had received no flying instruction, managed to land his glider safely after both pilots had been killed at the controls. Major Sweeney describes how Alsopp sat speechless in the station ticket office (Sweeney’s HQ) for the rest of the day ‘absolutely devastated by what he had done.’ (The Commanding Officer recommended Alsopp for the DFC - which was turned down). Three quarters of the incoming gliders were hit by flak. The 52nd Light Infantry lost more than 100 officers and men in the initial landing, and it was impossible to unload many of the gliders containing jeeps and heavy support weapons until after dark:
‘Support Company suffered the worst casualties, as all their gliders carried jeeps and a great deal of ammunition. It seems amazing that none of us realized that, whereas a glider loaded with troops could take an enormous amount of punishment, could be raked by anti-aircraft fire and yet continue to fly provided that both pilots are not hit, a glider containing a jeep with full petrol tanks, spare cans and ammunition could catch fire and probably blow up from the first unlucky bullet.
The gliders were built of wood, paper and glue and, being covered in dope, they burnt like celluloid. None of us fully appreciated this danger, nor the fact that the landing zone might be obscured by smoke. We blissfully relied on the fact that the anti-aircraft guns we encountered were going to be knocked out before we arrived but, unfortunately, they were not. Probably we should have done better and saved many valuable lives if we had flown in the heavy weapons as a second wave - but is easy to be wise after the event’.
At first the battle was very confused, as are all airborne assaults. In addition to the several private battles going on around ‘D’ Company objectives, ammunition was continually exploding in the burning gliders, and it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe. Fortunately most of the German troops manning the anti-aircraft guns were of low calibre, and surrendered when they found themselves surrounded by airborne troops in the midst of the crashing gliders.
Over one hundred prisoners were taken, and others escaped to the east. But as the anti-aircraft guns were knocked out, enemy machine guns and mortars in Ringenburg and the small garrison defending the bridge in the Royal Ulster Rifles’ area opened fire on the landing zone, and three German medium tanks escorted by motor-cyclists, apparently fleeing to the east, drove across the area while landing was still in progress. Although they did not wait to become engaged, they fired tracer bullets into several wrecked gliders, setting them alight before the casualties aboard them could get clear. The Royal Ulster Rifles ‘drummed up’ one of these tanks before it could escape over their bridge.
At about 13.00 hrs, American Liberator bombers flew over and dropped supplies near Hamminkeln. Unfortunately they appeared to think that the troops on the ground were German and shot them up with their machine guns. However, no one was hit, and the incident was soon forgotten.
Consolidating the Bridgehead
Despite the heavy casualties, all objectives were quickly captured and occupied. At 11.00 hrs wireless contact with Brigade HQ was established and it was reported that the position was captured. By midday firing had ceased, and the 52nd Light Infantry consolidated and dug in. After the initial fighting on landing, the enemy left the 52nd in peace for the remaining hours of daylight, though something was brewing behind Ringenburg, and a counter-attacked was expected at any moment. Only four of the Regiment’s twelve 3-inch mortars were in action. It was learned from the supporting gunners that the Air-Landing Light Regiment had lost half of its guns during the landing. However, they were able to make contact with the medium artillery west of the Rhine, and so they were not entirely without support.
The Regiment was now able to collect their wounded. There were over a hundred, and some were in a very bad way. Two Medical Officers - Captain S. Smith, Medical Officer to the 52nd Light Infantry and Captain Prentice of the Field Ambulance - did wonderful work treating the wounded, working in the cramped quarters of the station buildings. The wounded were remarkably patient and cheerful. They well knew that there was no chance for them to be evacuated from the battlefield until the ground forces linked up, but they hung on. Fortunately, during the evening of 24th March the casualties were evacuated to a medical centre that had been established by divisional headquarters farther to the rear:
‘To the east, over the River Issel, the village of Ringenburg was surrounded by a thick, circular belt of elm trees, and completely hidden. Between Ringenburg and the river lay the broad curve of the Autobahn, which was so steeply banked at this point that enemy tanks could form up behind unseen. The River Issel was a narrow stream, embanked like a canal about three feet above the level of the fields. The road bridge was a small, hump-backed, brick bridge, and the railway bridge was of single cantilever span girder construction. The railway itself had been heavily bombed, and was blocked by two bombed-out locomotives. In the station stood a train of goods wagons loaded with shells. Captain Gerahty found to his consternation that he had dug his slit trench under the cover of a closed box wagon loaded with bombs. The surrounding country was level, arable land, un-hedged except along the roads. There were a number of trees along the roads and tracks, and particularly around the station buildings. The few buildings in the area were of brick construction with tiled roofs’.
The Enemy Counter-Attack
During the evening of 24th March, an enemy post opened fire on ‘C’ Company at the railway bridge. At 20.00 hrs Lieutenant Stone took out a fighting patrol and silenced it, killing two Germans and taking two prisoners. A little later, ‘B’ Company, holding the road bridge heard tanks approaching from Ringenburg, and medium artillery fire was brought down onto the area. This was not effective and at about midnight enemy tanks and infantry attacked the bridge. The anti-tank guns engaged the enemy and scored hits, but the tanks were not disabled and continued to threaten the bridge. The fighting round the bridge in the darkness became very confused. The ‘B’ Company position on the east side of the bridge was overrun and Lieutenant Clark led his platoon in a charge to retake it. As it seemed unlikely that ‘B’ Company could keep the enemy from crossing the Brigade Commander ordered the bridge to be blown. This was done at 02.30 hrs when an enemy tank was almost across it. The attack ceased at 03.00 hrs, but British medium artillery kept up harassing fire.
At 04.00 hrs a small force of enemy infantry started working round the northern side of the 52nd’s position, and managed to infiltrate in the dark between ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies, who were very thin on the ground. At 04.45 hrs the enemy force attacked ‘C’ Company and overran one platoon position in the dark. They captured an anti-tank-gun detachment and SOS fire was called down. The CO then ordered ‘A’ Company to counter-attack to stabilize the situation, and at the same time troops of the 12th Devons moved up and took over the road junction held by ‘A’ Company while the counter-attack was launched. On being attacked the enemy withdrew, and the perimeter was intact again.
At 05.30 hrs enemy tanks started moving about again between Ringenburg and the river. Two German medium tanks were observed and a request was radioed to Brigade Headquarters for an air strike at dawn. At 07.00 hrs six Typhoon ‘tank-busting’ fighters appeared overhead and gave a brilliant display, diving on Ringenburg from all angles and attacking the enemy tanks with rockets. They apparently scored several hits, as columns of black, oily smoke rose from the area. However, they were unable to knock out one heavy tank which was in a hull-down position covering the blown bridge. This tank fired on the 52nd throughout the day, and later killed Captain Moncrieff, who had just taken over command of Support Company.
During the afternoon movement was observed in buildings to the north and north-west and in the evening ‘D’ Company made a raid under cover of artillery and mortar fire which succeeded in clearing these buildings for a while. In our morning situation report to Brigade Headquarters we were able to state that our position was intact and no enemy were in our area. This report showed the Regiment’s strength as:
‘A’ Company - four officers and fifty-six other ranks.
‘B’ Company - two officers and forty-five other ranks.
‘C’ Company - four officers and fifty-two other ranks.
‘D’ Company - five officers and fifty-eight other ranks.
The Regiment was at slightly less than half strength and the men were getting tired. Nevertheless, the day was fine, sunny and warm, and the enemy were not very active. At about 12.00 hrs, it was reported that the leading troops of the ground forces had made contact with the parachute brigades.
At 19.00 hrs the Commanding Officer attended a conference at Brigade Headquarters at which the relief of the Brigade was planned. Shortly after dusk, advance parties of the 157th Brigade of 52nd (Lowland) Division arrived to reconnoitre the position and post guides for the relieving troops. However, the 52nd had still not finished with the enemy for the day, and at 20.40 hrs ‘A’ Company mounted a further raid on the buildings to the north. It was successful although the raiding party was engaged by several groups of enemy troops, and on one occasion they were fired upon from behind a group of civilians bearing a white flag. Lieutenant Gunter, who led the raid, was wounded in the ensuing shooting.
At about midnight the Cameronians started moving in to take over from the Regiment. They were rather noisy and the enemy shelled the area throughout the relief. However, few casualties were sustained, and the 52nd Light Infantry marched out dog-tired. By 02.00 hrs the Regiment had concentrated in some farm buildings on the western outskirts of Hamminkeln where everyone snatched a few hours sleep in preparation for the advance into Germany that was planned to begin the next day.
Summing Up
‘The airborne drop was of such depth that all enemy artillery and rear defensive positions were inundated and destroyed reducing in one day a position that might have taken many days by ground attack only’. General Matthew Ridgeway
It was concluded that Operation ‘Varsity’ had been a success, notwithstanding that the losses to the vehicles and stores carried in by glider were around 50%, while the human casualties were similar to those sustained on D-Day. Despite the chaotic conditions, a sufficient number of gliders landed on their objectives, but it proved impossible to unload many of the jeeps and supporting weapons until after dark. The introduction of the Mk II Horsa with the swing nose undoubtedly saved lives as the glider could be unloaded very quickly, providing the nose was not damaged. It was concluded that the Air-Landing Brigade might have done better and many valuable lives saved if the support weapons had been flown in as a second wave after the Landing Zones had been secured. It was a stroke of luck that elements of the American 513 Parachute Regimental Combat Team who had been dropped wide in the Air-Landing Brigade area, took on some of the defenders before heading off for their proper RVs.
No one had fully appreciated the possibility that the landing areas might be obscured by smoke and dust, forcing the tugs to fly in 1,000 feet higher than planned and preventing many glider pilots from identifying their landing points until they were very low. The landings also relied on the effective suppression of the flak defences beforehand - a task which, in the event, was incomplete, even though the 30 minute anti-flak bombardment just before the landings on the morning of D-Day had been carried out by no less than 544 guns of all calibres followed up by ground-attack by fighters.
Major General Fiebig, the commander of the German 84th .Infantry Division stated later in his interrogation that while he had been expecting an Allied airborne landing, the sudden arrival in broad daylight of two divisions on top of his positions had had a shattering effect on his troops who had already been subject to a heavy bombardment and air attack.